





















Social System Inference from Noisy Observations
Yanbing Mao, Naira Hovakimyan, Tarek Abdelzaher, and Evangelos Theodorou
Abstract—This paper studies social system inference from a
single trajectory of public evolving opinions, wherein observation
noise leads to the statistical dependence of samples on time
and coordinates. We first propose a cyber-social system that
comprises individuals in a social network and a set of information
sources in a cyber layer, whose opinion dynamics explicitly
takes confirmation bias, negativity bias and process noise into
account. Based on the proposed social model, we then study
the sample complexity of least-square auto-regressive (AR(1))
model estimation, which governs the number of observations that
are sufficient for the identified model to achieve the prescribed
levels of accuracy and confidence. Building on the identified
social model, we then investigate social inference, with particular
focus on the weighted network topology, the subconscious bias
and the model parameters of confirmation bias and negativity
bias. Finally, the theoretical results and the effectiveness of the
proposed social systems are validated by the US Senate Member
Ideology data.
Index Terms—Social inference, network topology, subconscious
bias, confirmation bias, negativity bias, sample complexity,
I. INTRODUCTION
DYNAMICAL network identification from observed nodalstates, with a particular focus on graph topology iden-
tification/reconstruction, has gained widespread attention in a
wide variety of fields, ranging from power networks [1] to
gene regulatory networks [2] and social networks [3]. Lever-
aging Bayesian analysis and estimation theory, compressed
sensing, optimization theory with sparsity constraints, and oth-
ers [4], structural equation models [5], autoregressive models
[6] and Wiener filtering [7] have been employed to identify
network topology. However, in social networks, individual
cognitive behaviors, e.g., confirmation bias [8], preferences for
outlying content [9] and distancing and striving for uniqueness
[10], in conjunction with observation noise, pose a formidable
challenge to network topology identification, especially in
the modern information era with information overload [11],
[12]. A fairly accurate social model which explicitly takes
cognitive behaviors as well as subconscious bias into account
is indispensable for the topology identification with prescribed
levels of accuracy and confidence (PAC).
The social model of opinion evolution has been an active
subject for decades, among which a few well-known models
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have been proposed to capture individual conformity, cog-
nitive and subconscious behaviors [13], [14]. For example,
DeGroot model [15] considers individual opinion evolution
as an average of her neighbors, which describes conformity
behavior. Friedkin-Johnsen model [16] incorporates individual
subconscious bias into opinion evolution, thereby making the
model more suitable to several real-life scenarios and applica-
tions [17]. Though imposing a bounded confidence on social
influence, Hegselmann-Krause model [18] has the capability
of addressing confirmation bias [19], which helps create “echo
chambers” within networks, in which misinformation and
polarization thrive [20]. Hegselmann-Krause model involves
a discontinuity in the influence impact, i.e., an individual
completely ignores the opinions that are “too far” from hers,
which renders the steady-state analysis difficult. As a remedy,
we proposed an opinion evolution model in [21], [22], which
is a variation of Friedkin-Johnsen model with continuous and
symmetric confirmation bias model. Recently, Abdelzaher et
al. in [11] and Xu et al. in [12] reveal the significant influence
of consumer preferences for outlying content on opinion polar-
ization in the modern era of information overload. Meanwhile,
Lamberson and Stuart in [9] suggest that negative information,
which is far away from expectations, is more “outlying.”
Motivated by these discoveries, we incorporate negativity
bias, which refers to a tendency to be more attentive and/or
responsive to a unit of negative information than to a unit of
positive information [9], to the previously proposed opinion
dynamics [21], [22]. Our opinion evolution model in this paper
also includes random process noise that describes model errors
and uncertainty.
Ignoring negativity bias, our study of competitive infor-
mation spread in social networks uncovers the dependence
of Nash equilibrium on network topology, subconscious bias
and confirmation bias parameters [21]; similar discoveries
appear in [23]. The studies therein indicate that inferring
network topology only is not sufficient for optimal decision
making in social networks [3]. Motivated by this observation,
concurrent inference of network topology and confirmation
bias are primarily investigated in [24], which however relies on
several rather restrictive assumptions: 1) an individual’s sub-
conscious bias equates to her initial opinion, 2) observations
of evolving opinions are completely reliable, i.e., noise-free,
and 3) negativity bias and process noise have no influence on
opinion evolution. To remove these assumptions, we propose
a social-system inference procedure, which is based on least-
square auto-regressive (AR(1)) model estimation. The infer-
ence objectives include weighted network topology, public
subconscious bias, model parameters of confirmation bias and
negativity bias.
Due to process and observation noise, one intuitive question
pertaining to the accuracy of social-system inference arises:
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how many observations are sufficient for the inference solution
to achieve PAC? To answer this question in the context of
system-matrix estimation, significant effort has been devoted
towards the sample complexity of ordinary least-square es-
timator in recent three years [25]–[29]. We note that the
analysis of sample complexity therein relies on Hanson-Wright
inequality [30], which requires zero-mean, unit-variance, sub-
gaussian independent coordinates for noise vectors. Banerjee
et al. in [31] considered the generalization of existing results
by allowing for statistical dependence on stochastic processes
via Johnson–Lindenstrauss transform, which however still
requires the noise variables to have zero mean and the marginal
random variables to be conditionally independent. In this
paper, we reveal that even if the observation noise vectors
have i.i.d coordinates and time, the noise leads to inevitable
statistical dependence of opinion observations on time and
coordinates. The statistical dependence and possible non-zero
mean of noise hinder the application of obtained sample
complexity in [25]–[29] to social system inference. These
observations motivate to investigate the sample complexity of
social system estimation in the presence of observation noise
with none-zero mean, which paves the way for the derivation
of social system inference.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• Building on Friedkin-Johnsen model [16], we propose an
opinion evolution model with incorporation of confirma-
tion bias, negativity bias and process noise.
• In the presence of observation noise with non-zero mean,
which results in statistical dependence of opinion ob-
servations on time and coordinates, we investigate the
sample complexity of proposed social system estimation.
• Building on social system estimation, we drive a social-
system inference procedure for weighted network topol-
ogy, subconscious bias, model parameters of confirmation
bias and negativity bias.
• We validate the theoretical results and the effectiveness of
proposed opinion evolution model by US Senate Member
Ideology data.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
preliminaries. In Sections III and IV, we investigate social
system estimation and social system inference, respectively.
We present validation results in Section V. We finally present
conclusions in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We let Rn and Rm×n denote the set of n-dimensional
real vectors and the set of m × n-dimensional real matrices,
respectively. N stands for the set of natural numbers, and
N0 = N
⋃
0. We let 1 and 0 denote the vectors of all ones and
all zeros, compatible dimensions. We define In as n-dimension
identity matrix. The superscript ‘⊤’ stands for the matrix
transposition. For a matrix W , [W ]i,j denotes the element in
row i and column j. Other important notations are highlighted
as follows:
||A|| : spectral norm of matrix A;
||A||F : Frobenius norm of matrix A;
||x|| : Euclidean norm of vector x;
E expectation operator;
Sn−1 : unit sphere in Rn;
Ωc : complement of event Ω;
P(Ω) : probability of event Ω;
λmin(A) : minimum eigenvalue of symmetric matrix A.
The social system is composed of n individuals in social
network and m information sources. The interaction among
individuals is modeled by a digraph G = (V,E), where V =
{v1, . . . , vn} is the set of vertices representing the individuals,
and E ⊆ V×V is the set of edges of the digraph G representing
the influence structure. The communication from information
sources to individuals is modeled by a bipartite digraph B =
(V
⋃
K,B), where K = {u1, . . . , um} is the set of vertices
representing information sources, and B ⊂ V×K is the set of
edges of the digraph.
B. Social Network Model
We consider the following model which is adopted from












yi(k)=xi(k)+oi(k), i∈V, k∈N. (1b)
Here we clarify the notations and variables.
• xi(k) ∈ [−1, 1] is individual vi’s opinion, yi(k) ∈ [−1, 1]
is her observed opinion; si ∈ [−1, 1] is her subconscious
bias (also referred to innate opinion), which is based
on inherent personal characteristics (e.g., socio-economic
conditions where the individual grew up and/or lives in)
[16]; hd(k) ∈ [−1, 1] is information source ud’s opinion.
• pi(k) denotes process noise due to model error and
uncertainty, oi(k) denotes observation noise.
• wij represents the influence of individual vj on vi, and
wij =
{
> 0, if (vi, vj) ∈ E
= 0, otherwise.
We note the individual-individual influence weights wijs
are cognition or knowledge trust based and thus fixed
over time, since the cognitive factors that can influence
trust decisions are founded on a deeper knowledge of
the other person and the stability of the other’s behavior
across time and contexts [32].
• The state-dependent influence weight cid(xi(k)) models
“confirmation bias” as
cid(xi(k))=2ǫi−ǫi|xi(k)−hd(k)|, with ǫi≥0. (2)
We note that function (2) can also model homophily
[10], [33]. It is used in this paper to describe the
symmetric confirmation bias, whose motivations are: 1)
both polarization and homogeneity are the results of the
conjugate effect of confirmation bias and social influence
[19], [34], 2) confirmation bias happens when a person
gives more weight to evidence that confirms their beliefs
and undervalues evidence that could disprove it [35].
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• The state-dependent influence weight nid(xi(k)) models
“negativity bias” as
nid(xi(k)) = ηi|x̄i(k)− hd(k)|, with ηi ≥ 0, (3)
where x̄i(k) denotes individual vi’s sensed expectation









The motivation behind the models (3) and (4) can be
explained by the significant impact of consumer prefer-
ences for outlying content on opinion polarization in the
era of information overload revealed in [11], [12], and
by the discoveries in [9] that 1) negative information,
which is far away from expectations, is more “outlying”
(which motivates the opinion distance between sensed
expectation and opinion of information source in (3)),
and 2) the negativity bias refers to a tendency that is
more attentive and/or responsive to a unit of negative
information than to a unit of positive information (which
motivates the strictly increasing function (3) w.r.t. opinion
distance, if ηi > 0).
• αi(xi(k)) ≥ 0 is the “resistance parameter” of individual
vi. To guarantee xi(k) ∈ [−1, 1] for ∀k ∈ N and ∀i ∈ V,











nid(xi(k)) = 1, ∀i∈V, (5)
where χ1 denotes the bound on process noise in this
paper, i.e. |pi(k)| < χi, ∀k ∈ N.
• Another motivation behind the state-dependent influence
(i.e., cid(xi(k)) in (2) and nid(xi(k)) in (3)) of infor-
mation sources on individuals is that information sources
lack the rational basis of trust, e.g., news media prioritizes
outlying information for attentiveness.
C. Inference Objectives
Our investigation of competitive information spread in so-
cial networks revealed the dependence of optimal informa-
tion spread strategies on subconscious bias, network topol-
ogy and confirmation bias [21]. Intuitively, taking consumer
preferences for outlying content into account, the optimal
decision would depend on negativity bias as well. Hereto,
the social-system inference objectives include subconscious
bias, weighted network topology and model parameters of
confirmation and negativity bias. We thus denote the social
inference solution by
S , (W̆ , s̆, ǫ̆, η̆). (6)
The proposed social-system inference framework is first
described in Figure 1, where the information sources are
required to strategically and temporarily express extremal
opinions −1 and +1 for obtaining the inference solution
(6). This requirement is due to the state-dependent influence
Figure 1. Social-system inference framework for solution (6) with PAC:
sample complexity determines the dwell time of strategic extremal opinions.
weights (2) and (3). If this requirement cannot be satisfied and
is removed, i.e. the information sources have no cooperation,
the information sources will be modeled as individuals in
a social network, and the inference solution (6) reduces to
(W̆ , s̆) for Friedkin-Johnsen model [16] or W̆ for DeGroot
model [15] as studied in [3].
Observing (2) and (3), we conclude that if information
sources express extremal opinions -1 or +1, the social dynam-
ics (1) transforms to a linear system, and if they express an
identical opinion, they are regarded as one information source
from the perspective of individuals. The formed linear systems
under this consideration are described as follows.
1) Extremal Opinion −1: Under the strategy that informa-
tion sources express the identical extremal opinion −1, i.e.,
hd(k) = −1 and |K| = 1, the dynamics in (1) transforms to
x(k + 1) = α+Wx(k) + p(k) (7a)
y(k) = x(k) + o(k), k ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1, p}, (7b)
where we define:
αi , (1 −
∑
j∈V












wij , if i 6=j.
(8b)
2) Extremal Opinion 1: Under the strategy that informa-
tion sources express the identical extremal opinion +1, i.e.,
hd(k) = +1 and |K| = 1, the dynamics in (1) transforms to
x(k + 1) = α+Wx(k) + p(k), (9a)























wij , if i 6=j.
(10b)
Remark 1: Ignoring process noise p(k), the dynamics (9a)
and (7a) have the same form of Friedkin-Johnsen model [16],
whose critical difference is that the matrix entries in (9a) and
(7a) are allowed to be negative, which is due to negativity
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bias.
To obtain (6), the social-system inference framework first
inputs observations of evolving opinions to estimate vectors α
and α and matrices W and W, which are denoted in
M , (α̂, α̂, Ŵ , Ŵ). (11)
D. Problem Formulation
In the context of learning-based competing camps in social
networks, competitive information sources leverage inference
solution (6) for later decision making of optimal opinions
that should be spread to her followers. Therefore, information
sources can only express extremal opinions temporality to infer
(6). Hereto, the dwell times of strategic extremal opinions, or
equivalently the number of observations, that are sufficient for
high accurate inference (6) constitutes the first problem of this
paper. Observing (10) and (8), we discover that the matrices W
and W include all of the inference objectives included in (6).
Motivated by this observation, the dwell time is determined
by the estimations of W and W in this problem, which is
formally stated as follows.
Problem I: Find the dwell times of strategic extremal
opinions that guarantee the estimations of W and W to be
(φ, δ)–PAC, i.e.
P(||Ŵ−W|| ≤ φ)≥1−δ and P(||Ŵ−W||≤φ)≥1−δ (12)
for φ > 0 and 0 < δ < 1.
Given the estimation solution (11), inferring (6) constitutes
the second problem.
Problem II: Determine a social-system inference procedure
that generates an estimation solution (11) with (φ, δ)–PAC and
inference solution (6).
Finally, to simplify the representations of investigations for
Problem I and Problem II, we define:
ϑ(k),
{
+1, k∈{k, . . . , p}
−1, k∈{1, . . . , p}, Aϑ(k),
{
W, ϑ(k)=+1




α, ϑ(k)=−1 , k , p+ 1, (13b)
based on which, we obtain the trajectory of observed public












−1 , j > p and i > j − p
Ai−1+1 , j > p and i ≤ j − p






−1 , j > p
Aj−1−1 , j ≤ p.
(15b)
III. PROBLEM I: SOCIAL SYSTEM ESTIMATION
In this section, we first present the least-square AR(1)
model estimation. We then present assumptions and investigate
sample complexity of estimation, leveraging which we derive
the dwell times of strategic extremal opinions for (φ, δ)–PAC.
We now present data processor of observations of public
evolving opinions, as shown in Figure 1, which is a necessary
step for sample complexity analysis.
ỹjg , y(g)− y(j), g < j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}. (16)
Correspondingly, we define:
x̃jg,x(g)−x(j), p̂jg,p(g)−p(j), õjg,o(g)−o(j). (17)
With the consideration of (13), (16) and (17), we obtain the
following dynamics from systems (7) and (9):
x̃
j+1
g+1 = Aϑ(g)x̃jg + p̂jg, ỹjg = x̃jg + õjg, g<j<k or j>g≥k
by which we then obtain the dynamics of ỹjg as
ỹ
j+1







g+1 −Aϑ(g)õjg, g<j<k or j>g≥k. (18b)
Remark 2: The noise term (18b) indicates the statistical
dependence of observed evolving opinions on time and co-
ordinates, which is induced by observation noise.
A. Least-Square AR(1) Model Estimation
We construct following data matrices:
Y(k,p),
[




k+2 , . . . , ỹ
p











k+1 , . . . , ỹ
p−1











ϑ(k+1), . . . , ĝ
p−1
ϑ(k+1), . . . , ĝ
p−1
ϑ(p−2)],
considering which, we verify from systems (18) that
Y(k,p) = Aϑ(k)X(k,p) + U(k,p), p<k or k≥k. (21)
We note that matrix U(k,p) is unknown. The relation (18) thus




from which we obtain the optimal estimation of matrix as
Âϑ(k) = Y(k,p)X⊤(k,p)(X(k,p)X⊤(k,p))−1. (22)
Considering (9) and (10), with obtained estimation (22), the






(y(q + 1)− Âϑ(k)y(q)). (23)
















We construct the following stacked vectors for presenting
assumptions on answering Problem I:
θ(k,p) , [o(k,p), p(k,p)]













⊤, . . . , (op−1k )
⊤], (27a)
o(k,p) , [ok, ok+1, . . . , op−3, op−2], (27b)
p̃j , [p
⊤(1), . . . , p⊤(j−2), p⊤(j−1)], (27c)
pi , [p̃i+1, p̃i+2, . . . , p̃p−2, p̃p−1], (27d)
p(k,p) , [pk, pk+1, . . . , pp−3, pp−2], (27e)
ãj , [α
⊤





ai , [ãi+1, ãi+2, . . . , ãp−2, ãp−1], (27g)
a(k,p) , [ak, ak+1, . . . , ap−3, ap−2], , (27h)
x(p,k) ,
[
x⊤(1), x⊤(1), . . . , x⊤(1)
]
∈ R (p−k)(p−k−1)n2 . (27i)
Meanwhile, we define the following stacked matrices:
Υ(k,p),diag{Ψ(k,p), . . . , Ψ(k,p)}∈Rl(k,p)×l(k,p) , (28)
U , diag {u, u, . . . , u}∈Rl(k,p)×
l(k,p)
n , (29)
Π(k,p) , [Il(k,p) , W(k,p), W(k,p), W̆(k,p)], (30)




(p− k)(p− k − 1)n, (31a)
W̆(k,p),diag{Mcg−Mcj}g<j∈{k,...,p−1}∈Rl(k,p)×l(k,p), (31b)
A(g,j) , [M(g−1,g)(In −M(j−g+1,j)), . . . ,
M(1,g)(In −M(j−g+1,j)), −M(j−g,j),
−M(j−g−1,j), . . . , −M(1,j)], g < j (31c)
Ak , diag{A(k,k+1), A(k,k+2), . . . , A(k,p−1)}, (31d)
W(k,p) , diag{Ak, Ak+1, . . . , Ap−3, Ap−2}. (31e)
We verify from (25)–(26), (30) and (31) that







∈ Rl(k,p) . (32b)
With the definitions at hand, we make the following assump-
tions for solving Problem I.
Assumption 1: Consider the social dynamics (1) with noise
ĝ
j
ϑ(k) in (18b), vectors in (25) and (26), matrices in (28)–(30).
1) p(k)
i.i.d.∼ Dp(0, σ2pIn), o(k)
i.i.d.∼ Do(µo1, σ2oIn).
2) θ(k,p) has the convex concentration property with con-
stant κ > 0 for k < p ∈ N.
3) [ĝj
ϑ(k)]i, i ∈ V, is Fk-measurable and conditionally γ-







2 , for all λ ∈ R, k<j∈{k+1, . . . , p−1}.
4) There exist scalars ̺1 > 0 and ̺2 > 0, such that∣∣∣||U⊤Υ⊤(k,p)Π(k,p)θ(k,p)||22+||U⊤Υ⊤(k,p)Π(k,p)θ(k,p)||22−1
∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣̺1 − ̺2||U⊤Υ⊤(k,p)Π(k,p)(θ(k,p) + θ(k,p))||22
∣∣∣ .
Remark 3: Examples under Assumptions 1-2) include any
random vector η ∈ Rs with independent coordinates and
almost sure |[η]i| ≤ 1 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , s}, random
vectors obtained via sampling without replacement, vectors
with bounded coordinates satisfying some uniform mixing
conditions or Dobrushin type criteria, among many others
[36]. Examples of [ĝj
ϑ(k)]i under Assumption 1-3) include a
bounded zero-mean noise lying in an interval of length at most
2γ, a zero-mean Gaussian noise with variance at most γ2 [37].
Remark 4 (None-Zero Mean): If p(k)
i.i.d.∼ Dp(µp1, σ2pIn),
it can be rewritten as p(k) = µp1 + p̃(k), with p̃(k)
i.i.d.∼
Dp(0, σ2pIn). In this scenario, model (9a), as an example, can
be written as x(k + 1) = (α + µp1) +Wx(k) + p̃(k). Thus,
Assumption 1-1) on process noise holds in general.
C. Sample Complexity
We now investigate the sample complexity of estimation
(22), whose associated conditions will answer Problem I.
Under Assumption 1-1), we obtain the covariance matrix of










where O denotes zero matrix with compatible dimensions.
Considering the covariance matrix, we present an auxiliary
proposition, whose proof appears in Appendix B.
Proposition 1: Under Assumption 1, the inequality (34)
holds for ε ∈ [0, 12 ) and some universal constant c > 0.
Leveraging Proposition 1, the sample complexity is pre-
sented in the following theorem, whose proof is presented in
Appendix C.
Theorem 1: Consider the estimated matrix Âϑ(k) in (22),
and the real matrix Aϑ(k) in (13). For any 0 ≤ ε < 12 , any
0<ρ<̺1, any ̺2>0, any 0<δ<1, and any φ>0, we have
P[||Âϑ(k) −Aϑ(k)|| > φ] ≤ δ, ∀ϑ(k) ∈ {−1,+1} (35)






























Remark 5: The dwell times of strategic extremal opinions
can be computed from the conditions (36) and (37). However,
the current forms are not ready for the computation, which
is due to the unknown Aϑ(k) included in Π(k,p) and Υ(k,p).
Noting the relation (5) and the fact that matrix Aϑ(k) is stable,
it is practical to know the matrix-norm bounds pertaining to
Aϑ(k), which can be further leveraged to estimate the bounds
on the matrix norms of Π(k,p) and Υ(k,p) to compute the dwell
times. This computation is carried out in next subsection.




straightforwardly computed under Assumption 1-1). Due to page limit, its























, p<k or k≥k. (34)
D. Dwell Times of Strategic Extremal Opinions
With the consideration of Aϑ(k) in (13) and Π(k,p) in (30),















≤ s ≤ 1. (39)
Remark 6: The inequality (39) is obtained via considering
(32), where −1 ≤ x̆(k,p) ≤ 1 and −1 ≤ θ(k,p) + θ(k,p) ≤ 1
hold for any k < p ∈ N and any xi(1) ∈ [−1, 1], i ∈ V.














(p− k − i)(p− 1− i)n. (41)
With the definitions at hand, we present a corollary of Theorem
1, whose proof is given in Appendix D.
































Remark 7 (Dwell Time Computation): We denote the dwell
times of strategic extremal opinions as τϑ(k) = p − k + 1.




p−k+1, k=k, ϑ(k)=+1 , s.t. (42) and (43).
IV. PROBLEM II: SOCIAL SYSTEM INFERENCE
With the obtained estimation (11), we investigate the com-
putation of (6). Considering the structures of real vectors and
matrices in (8) and (10), we write estimations (22) and (23)




































w̆ij)s̆i − (ǫ̆i + η̆i)(1 + s̆i), (44d)
Algorithm 1: Inference From Estimation
























































, if i 6=j.
based on which the inference procedure is described by
Algorithm 1. The associated analysis are presented in the
following theorem, whose proof appears in Appendix E.
Theorem 2: Consider inference procedure in Algorithm 1.
• If the inferred subconscious bias s̆i 6= 0 for ∀i ∈ V,
Algorithm 1 generates inference solution (6).
• If individual vi’s inferred subconscious bias is neutral,
i.e., s̆i = 0, Algorithm 1 cannot infer her associated social
structure w̆ij and model parameters of confirmation bias
ǫ̆i and negativity bias η̆i.
V. EMPIRICAL VALIDATION
In this section, we use US Senate Member Ideology data
[38] to validate the theoretical results and model from perspec-
tives of generalization error and model error. Since a senate
member usually retires after (at most) twelve congresses, it
is not practical to model the state member as an individual
in our proposed opinion evolution model. Alternatively, an
individual in our model represents one US state, and her
opinion corresponds to the average of ideological data of
senate members from the same state. Meanwhile, we model
US President as information source in our model. To perform
validation, we use the first-dimension ideological data obtained
via Nokken-Poole estimation, which describes the economic
liberalism-conservatism of a member. We consider the data
of the 37th Congress to the 116th Congress, during which
US President is from Republican Party or Democratic Party.
However, the ideology of US President is not estimated [38].
As an alternate, we set the default ideology of the president
as +1 if the president is from the Republican Party, and −1
if the president is from the Democratic Party.
We make the worst-case assumptions on noise, i.e., σo =
σp = 1. To guarantee Assumptions 1-3) and 1-4) hold, we
choose γ = 1.59, ̺1 = 0.394 and ̺2 = 0.2. For matrix-
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(i) Prediction: 107th Congress to 116th Congress
Prediction Errors: fixed model (46)
Prediction Errors: switching model (45)
































































Figure 2. (i): Seventeen states’ model-based prediction errors; (ii)-(v): four
states’ real and predicted trajectories of ideology.
norm bounds, we choose s = 1 and s = 0.0001. We set other




The dynamics (7) and (9) show that when the information
sources hold extremal opinions, the proposed model (1) trans-
forms to linear stochastic systems but have distinctive differ-
ences. This observation indicates that if the inferred social
systems are leveraged for prediction, the inferred switching
model that corresponds to (7) and (9), i.e.,
y(k + 1) = α̂+ Ŵy(k), Democratic Party (45a)
y(k + 1) = α̂+ Ŵy(k), Republican Party (45b)
would have smaller prediction error than that of a fixed
social model, e.g., DeGroot model [15] or Friedkin-Johnsen
model [16]. For the comparison, the fixed model via estima-
tions (22) and (23) is Friedkin-Johnsen model based, i.e.,
y(k + 1) = α̂+ Ŵy(k). (46)
We use the ideological data of 40th Congress to 106th
Congress to infer models and save the rest of data to measure
prediction error. Meanwhile, we assume we know that in the
116th, 115th and 107th–110th Congresses, US Presidents are
from Republican Party, while in the 111th-114th Congresses,
US Presidents are from Democratic Party. We follow the
following procedure to perform the model-based prediction.
• We consider three group data: Republican Data (extracted
if president is from Republican Party), Democratic Data
(extracted if president is from Democratic Party) and
Mixed Data (no separation).
• We use the Democratic Data, Republican Data and Mixed
Data to respectively infer the sub-models (45b) and (45a)
and the fixed model (46), via estimations (22) and (23).
• For the prediction, we input the ideological data of the
107th Congress as the same initial condition for the
switching model (45) and the fixed model (46).
• From the 107th to 110th Congresses, we use model (45b)
for prediction, from the 111th to 114th Congresses, we
switch to model (45a) for prediction, in the 115th and
116th Congresses, we switch back to model (45b) for
prediction.
We note the sizes of Republican Data and Democratic Data are
38 and 28, which means (k, p) = (1, 28) and (k, p) = (29, 69).
Then, following Corollary 1, for the (1.39, 0.1)-PAC, the
allowed maximum network size is 17. Hence, we consider
a network with 17 US states. We denote individual vi’s
predicted ideology at congress number k by y̆i(k). We define






|yi(k)− y̆i(k)|, i∈{MD, SC,AL, . . . , IL, FL}.
The seventeen states’ prediction errors, and the picked four
states’ real ideology and predicted trajectories are respectively
shown in Figure 2 (i)-(v), observing which we discover that
switching social model (45) with guaranteed (1.39, 0.1)-PAC
has more accurate prediction than a single fixed model (46).
B. Model Error and Fitting Error
Differentiating from numerical examples and man-made
systems, e.g., cyber-physical systems, we do not have real
exact model parameters as references to straightforwardly
measure model error pertaining to (φ, δ)–PAC. Observing the
structures of matrices and vectors in (8) and (10) and recalling
the convex combination (5), we can perform model validation
from the following social-system properties:







≤ 1, ∀i ∈ V.
• The magnitudes of all entries of W and W are smaller
than one.
• The fitting curve and the trajectories of inferred model
under arbitrary initial condition in [−1, 1], are all con-
strained into [−1, 1] for any time.
We now consider the ideological data of the 40th to 116th
Congresses. The sizes of Republican Data and Democratic
Data are 44 and 32, which means (k, p) = (1, 32) and


































Inferred Model: fitting curve
Real Ideology
Trajectories: random initial conditions Trajectories: random initial conditions
Inferred Model: fitting curve
Real Ideology
Figure 3. (a)-(f): Evolving ideology under 1000 random initial conditions;
(g)-(h): fitting curve and trajectories under five random initial conditions.
the allowed network size is 6. Then, by (22) and (23), we have




0.5252 0.0873 −0.1641 0.0730 −0.3392 −0.0049
−0.2307 0.4495 −0.0037 0.1190 0.0151 0.1655
−0.2311 0.0762 0.2090 0.1117 0.0155 0.1779
0.0914 0.0030 0.1943 0.4089 0.0589 0.0940
−0.1274 −0.0977 0.1578 0.0076 0.6119 0.1121








[Ŵ ]:,j = [0.1928, 0.4685, 0.4578, 0.9982, 0.6654,
0.6399]⊤ < 1. Thus, the properties of social-system matrix
are demonstrated to hold. The trajectories of inferred model
under 1000 randomly generated initial conditions in [−1, 1]
are shown in Figure 3 (a)-(f), which shows that all of the
trajectories are constrained into [−1, 1]. By Algorithm 1, some
individuals are inferred to have negativity bias. The results
together also demonstrate the correctness of the statement in
Remark 1.
We next increase the size of social network to include all
of the 30 states in the 40th Congress. We recall that the size
of Democratic Data is 32, which implies the maximum size of
social network is 30. We thus can conclude the inference of the
social network with 30 individuals hardly achieves any (φ, δ)–
PAC. In this setting, the fitting curve and the five trajectories
under random initial conditions in [−1, 1] are shown in Figure
3 (g) and (h), which show that although the inferred model fit
the real data well, without satisfying high PAC, the inferred
model has larger model error such that its evolving ideology
under some initial condition exceeds the range [−1, 1] and the
inferred model can be unstable.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an opinion evolution model
which explicitly takes confirmation bias, negativity bias and
process noise into account. Based on the proposed model, we
have studied the problem of social system inference of network
topology, subconscious and model parameters of confirmation
and negativity bias. We have analyzed the sample complexity
of the proposed inference procedure in the presence of ob-
servation noise, which leads to the statistical dependence of
observed public evolving opinions on time and coordinates.
Real data validations suggest the effectiveness of the obtained
theoretical results and the proposed opinion evolution model.
Some of future directions are listed as follows.
• We will investigate the sample complexity of social sys-
tem inference in the scenario that process and observation
noise have time-varying means and variances.
• We will investigate cost function learning for learning-
based competitive information spread in social networks.
APPENDIX A: AUXILIARY LEMMAS
Lemma 1: [36] Let f be a mean zero random vector in Rn,
whose covariance matrix is denoted by Cov(f). If f has the
convex concentration property with constant κ, then for any






















for some universal constant c.
Lemma 2: [39] Let W be an d × d a symmetric random
matrix. Furthermore, let N be an ε-net of Sd−1 with minimal
cardinality. Then for all ρ > 0, we have





P [||Wu||2 > (1− ε)ρ] , ε ∈ [0, 1). (47)









, ε ∈ [0, 1
2
). (48)
Lemma 3: [37] Let {Ft}t≥1 be a filtration. Let {ηt}t≥1
be a stochastic process adapted to {Ft}t≥1 and taking values
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in R. Let {xt}t≥1 be a predictable stochastic process with
respect to {Ft}t≥1, taking values in Rd. Furthermore, assume
that ηt is Fk-measurable and conditionally γ-sub-Gaussian for
some γ > 0. Let S > 0, η⊤ = [η2, η3, . . . , ηt+1], and X
⊤ =



















holds with the probability of at least 1− δ.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
It follows from (24) that
E[Ψ⊤(k,p)X(k,p)X
⊤
(k,p)Ψ(k,p)] = In, (49)

























Then, observing U in (29), Υ(k,p) in (28), X(k,p) in (20), and
relation (32), we have
X⊤(k,p)Ψ(k,p)u = U
⊤Υ⊤(k,p)Π(k,p)(θ(k,p) + θ(k,p)), (52)







We note that (49), in conjunction with (50) and (52),
implies E||X⊤(ϑ(k),p)Ψ(k,p)u||22 = E||U⊤Υ⊤(k,p)Π(k,p)(θ(k,p) +











where (54) from previous step is obtained via considering
E||U⊤Υ⊤(k,p)Π(k,p)(θ(k,p) + θ(k,p))||22
= E||U⊤Υ⊤(k,p)Π(k,p)θ(k,p)||22 + ||U⊤Υ⊤(k,p)Π(k,p)θ(k,p)||22,






which follows from u ∈ Sn−1, (29), (31a) and the well-known






















Under Assumption 1-1), we first verify from (26) and (25)
with (27) that θ(k,p) has zero mean. Since c > 0 and ρ > 0,
under Assumption 1-2), applying Lemma 1 (in Appendix A)
with (57) and (56), we conclude that∣∣∣||Υ⊤(k,p)Π(k,p)θ(k,p)||22 −E||Υ⊤(k,p)Π(k,p)θ(k,p)||22
∣∣∣ > ρ




















where C(k,p) , E[θ(k,p)θ
⊤
(k,p)]. It follows from θ(k,p) in (26)
and C(k,p) in (33) that ||C(k,p)|| = ||C(k,p)||, noting which,

























Then, applying (48) in Lemma 2 leads to Proposition 1.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Observing the relation (21) and the optimal estimation (22),













||̺2Ψ⊤(k,p)X(k,p)X⊤(k,p)Ψ(k,p) − ̺1In|| ≤ ρ
}
, (59)
from which we have









Upper Bound on P(Ec2): Let us set γ =
√
2cκ, inserting











































Upper Bound on P(E1
⋂
E2): When E2 occurs, we have
̺1 − ρ
̺2




where 0 < ρ < ̺1. We then have
̺1 − ρ
̺2










Ψ−2(k,p)) , β̆. (63)
We note that
||(X(k,p)X⊤(k,p))0.5||=λ0.5max(X(k,p)X⊤(k,p))≥λ0.5min(X(k,p)X⊤(k,p)),










































































We note that under Assumption 1-3), u ∈ Sn−1 implies
that (ĝj+1
ϑ(k+1))
⊤u is Fk-measurable and conditionally γ-sub-
Gaussian for some γ > 0. Meanwhile, we note that 4cκ2 =
2γ2. In light of Lemma 3 in Appendix A, we then have
P[A2(u)] ≤ δ0. Furthermore, applying (47) with the setting
of ε = 12 in Lemma 2, we obtain
P[A1] ≤ 5nmax
u∈N
P[A2(u)] ≤ 5nδ0. (69)
We let δ0 =
δ





























































where the last inequality from its previous step is obtained via
considering the inequality X(k,p)X
⊤
(k,p) ≤ ̺1+ρ̺1−ρS that follows
from (66) and (62).

















by which, and considering (65) and (67), we deduce that
under condition (70), if the event E1 occurs, the event A1






































by which we conclude that (70) holds if the condition (37) is
satisfied. Moreover, recalling that the event E2 always occurs
under the condition (36) (proved in Upper Bound on P(Ec2)),
we conclude from (71) and (69) that
P[E1
⋂
E2] ≤ P[A1] ≤ 5nδ0
holds as long as both (36) and (37) hold. In addition, due to
δ0 =
δ







Finally, combining (60) with (61) and (72) yields (35).
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APPENDIX D: PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Condition (43): Under Assumption 1-1), we obtain from













≥ 2σ2oIn + (j − 1)σ2psIn,








where l(k,p) and l̂(k,p) are given in (31a) and (41), respectively.







σ2p = f(k,p), (73)
which implies that (37) holds if (43) is satisfied.
Condition (42): With the consideration of (39), it follows
from (28) and (30) with (31) that ||Υ(k,p)||2 = ||Ψ(k,p)||2. We




















Considering (39) and (74) and recalling the well-known
inequality ‖AB‖ ≤ ‖A‖ ‖B‖, we arrive at
||Π⊤(k,p)Υ(k,p)||2 ≤ ||Π(k,p)||2||Υ(k,p)||2 ≤ j(k,p), (75)




















which indicates that if (42) is satisfied, (36) holds.
APPENDIX E: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We obtain from (44) that
[â+1]i − [â−1]i = 2(ǫ̆i + η̆i), (76)
[â+1]i + [â−1]i = 2(1−
∑
j∈V
w̆ij)s̆i − 2(ǫ̆i + η̆i)s̆i, (77)
∑
j∈V
([Â+1]i,j − [Â−1]i,j) = 2(η̆i − ǫ̆i)s̆i, (78)
∑
j∈V
([Â+1]i,j + [Â−1]i,j) = 2
∑
j∈V
w̆ij − 2η̆i + 2ǫ̆i. (79)



















adding (80) into which, we arrive at
1
s̆i








which results in the computation of s̆i in Line 1 of Algorithm
1. With computed s̆i, from (76) and (78) we have





([Â+1]i,j − [Â−1]i,j) = 4ǫ̆i,





([Â+1]i,j − [Â−1]i,j) = 4η̆i,
which indicates the computations of ǫ̆i and η̆i in in Lines 2
and 3 of Algorithm 1, respectively. With the obtained ǫ̆i and
η̆i, the relation (79) implies the computation of the sum of
social-influence weights in Line 4 of Algorithm 1. We obtain
from (44a) and (44b) that











)w̆ij , if i 6=j
which, with the computed ǫ̆i and the sum
∑
j∈V
w̆ij , lead to
the computation of weighted network topology in Line 5 of
Algorithm 1.
Finally, we note that the computations in Lines 2–5 rely on
the assumption that s̆i 6= 0, otherwise individual vi’s asso-
ciated social structure and model parameters of confirmation
and negativity bias cannot be inferred.
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